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A. INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, an agent acting beyond the confi nes of his authority is unable 
to create contractual relations between his principal and another party (the “third 
party”). Apparent authority operates to temper the effect of this rather severe rule, 
protecting third parties where the principal creates an impression of authority 
which he subsequently wishes to deny. This article seeks to identify the principles 
of the Scots law of apparent authority which are, at present, far from clear. It 
then places those principles within a comparative context, examining them in the 
light of three international “codes” or instruments: the UNIDROIT Convention 
on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, the Principles of European Contract 
Law, and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
2004. In the process this reveals the ease with which Scots law could adapt to 
harmonisation of agency law at European level, should this occur. The article also 
considers moves away from traditional reasoning on apparent authority, based on 
bar or estoppel, towards reasoning based on what is known as “the risk principle”, 
typifi ed in recent case law of the Dutch Supreme Court.
Apparent authority, which Stoljar described as “the chief problem in agency”,1 
is a concept which is well-known in both Common Law and Civilian legal systems. 
It is one of two main exceptions to the rule that an unauthorised agent is unable to 
bind his principal in a contract with the third party2 (the other exception being the 
principal’s ability to ratify a contract which the unauthorised agent purported to 
conclude).3 It applies where the principal, through his acts or omissions, has given 
the third party to understand that the agent was fully authorised to enter into the 
particular contract. The third party, relying on that impression, naturally considers 
himself bound in a contract with the principal. If the principal then seeks to deny 
the existence of a contract, citing the agent’s lack of authority, apparent authority, 
as a form of personal bar, prevents the principal from acting inconsistently. In 
this way, the principal is barred from pleading the agent’s lack of authority in the 
context of an action raised by the third party, who is thus afforded the same level 
of protection as he would have had if a contract binding him to the principal had 
actually existed.
However, this well-known concept lacks a solid conceptual framework. The 
problem is particularly acute in a legal system such as Scotland’s, where the 
amount of case law is small. As a result, it is natural to look outwards in order 
to study the concept in a wider European framework. The three initiatives used 
1 S J Stoljar, The Law of Agency (1961) 20.   
2 W M Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 143.  
3 Although ratifi cation is subject to relatively stringent conditions: see L Macgregor, “Agency and 
Mandate”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2002) paras 62-74.
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in this article to provide a comparative context have been identifi ed above. The 
fi rst is the UNIDROIT Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods 
(“the Convention”).4 Dating from 1983, it has yet to come into force, lacking 
the minimum of ten ratifi cations.5 The second is the Principles of European 
Contract Law (“PECL”),6 which devotes an entire chapter to agency.7 This initia-
tive is especially important given the moves within the European Union towards 
harmonisation in the fi eld of contract law, particularly the European Commission’s 
plans to create a Common Frame of Reference for European contract lawyers.8 
The third is the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
2004 (“PICC”).9 In contrast to the aim of the Convention, PECL and PICC are 
of a non-binding nature and can be considered “soft law”. They aim to establish 
rules of general contract law within the European Union and on a world-wide 
level, respectively.10
Apparent authority focuses on placing liability on the principal, either in the 
form of a damages action raised by a third party, or an action for implement of the 
contract purportedly formed by the agent. The principal is not, however, the only 
party liable in this situation. The third party may raise an action against the agent 
for what is known in Scotland as breach of warranty of authority,11 or more gener-
ally in Europe as the liability of the falsus procurator. This type of action is less 
common, probably because it is often impossible, the agent having absconded. 
4 Available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1983agency/main.htm. The UNIDROIT 
Agency Convention is referred to in the footnotes as “UAC”. See further D Busch, Indirect Represen-
tation in European Contract Law: an evaluation of Articles 3:301 – 304 of the Principles of European 
Contract Law concerning some contractual aspects of indirect representation against the background of 
Dutch, German and English law (2005) 175-195; M J Bonell, “Agency”, in A Hartkamp, M Hesselink, E 
Hondius, C Joustra, E Du Perron and M Veldman (eds), Towards a European Civil Code, 3rd edn (2004) 
381.
5 See art 33 UAC. There are currently fi ve: France ratifi ed on 7 August 1987, Italy on 16 June 1986, and 
Mexico, the Netherlands and South Africa acceded to the Convention on 22 December 1987, 2 Febru-
ary 1994 and 27 January 1986 respectively. Since 2 February 1995 the accession of the Netherlands has 
also applied to Aruba. As regards these ratifi cations see http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-
main.htm.
6 Available  at http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/Skabelon/pecl_
engelsk.htm. See A Hartkamp, “Principles of Contract Law”, in Hartkamp et al, Towards a European 
Civil Code (n 4) 125; Busch, Indirect Representation (n 4) 197-210; Bonell (n 4).
7 Chapter 3: Authority of Agents. For the full text with comments and notes, see O Lando and H Beale 
(eds), The Principles of European Contract Law: Parts I and II (2000).
8 See European Commission Communication to the European Parliament, A More Coherent European 
Contract Law: An Action Plan (COM (2003) 68 fi nal).   
9 See Chapter 2: Formation and Authority of Agents; Section 2: Authority of Agents. For the full text 
of PICC with commentary, see UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, 
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinci-
ples2004-e.pdf.
10 On the purposes of PECL and PICC, see the preamble to PICC, and art 1:101 PECL.
11 Macgregor (n 3) paras 166-171.
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Alternatively, it may be a less attractive option to the third party because the 
agent’s fi nancial standing is usually weaker than that of the principal. Although 
breach of warranty of authority is not considered in this article, its availability 
should at least be borne in mind.
B. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: SCOPE
Before analysing apparent authority in detail, it is helpful to explore briefl y the 
context of the agency rules appearing in the international instruments. Generally, 
the Convention is more limited than the other instruments, applying only to the 
international sale of goods,12 whereas PECL and PICC govern agency in general.13 
All three are limited to agency created by the exercise of the will of the person 
represented, namely the principal. PECL and PICC explicitly provide that they 
do not govern an agent’s authority conferred by law or the authority of an agent 
appointed by a public or ju dicial authority,14 while a similar restriction can be 
inferred from several provisions in the Convention.15 References to the creation of 
agency through the “will” of the principal should not, however, be taken to indicate 
that the instruments are irrelevant as regards company law. This is not the case, 
although the position, explored in the next section, is undoubtedly complex. All 
three instruments consider only the external aspects of representation. In other 
words, they focus on the relationship between the principal or agent and the third 
party rather than the “internal” relationship between the principal and agent.16 
12 See arts 1(1), (2) UAC. This limitation applies because the UAC is regarded as an addition to the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, which is itself applicable only to 
the international sale of goods. See the preamble to the Convention, and M Evans, “Explanatory report 
on the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods” (1984-I) Uniform Law Review 73 at 
81.
13 Art 3:101(1) PECL; art 2.2.1(1) PICC.
14 Art 3:101(2) PECL; art 2.2.1(3) PICC.
15 For limitations in the scope of the UAC, see arts 3(1), 4. But see also art 30(1): “A Contrac ting State may 
at any time declare that it will apply the provisions of this Convention to specifi ed cases falling outside 
its sphere of application.”    
16 Art 1(3) UAC; art 3:101(3) PECL; art 2.2.1(2) PICC. The rights and duties as between principal and 
agent are governed by their agreement and the applicable law which, with respect to specifi c types of 
agency relationships (such as those concerning “commercial agents”), may provide mandatory rules 
for the protection of the agent. See UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 74.  For commercial agents, see 
Council Directive 1986/653 OJ 1986 L382/17 on the co-ordination of the laws of member states relat-
ing to self-employed commercial agents, implemented in the UK by the Commercial Agents (Council 
Directive) Regulations 1993, SI 1993/3053, as amended by SI 1993/3173 and SI 1998/2868. 
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C. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND COMPANY LAW
(1) The UNIDROIT Agency Convention
The Convention is inapplicable to representation in company law only where the 
representation is authorised. It may therefore apply to cases of unauthorised repre-
sentation of companies. It is also applicable if the power of representation is not 
based on an authority conferred by law or by the constitutive documents of the 
entity concerned, i.e. if a company grants authority to act on its behalf to one of its 
employees other than a director.17 It can furthermore be inferred from article 15(7) 
of the Convention that its application is not absolutely excluded in cases of repre-
sentation of legal persons yet to be incorporated: “[w]here the act has been carried 
out on behalf of a corporation or other legal person before its creation, ratifi cation 
is effective only if allowed by the law of the State governing its creation”.
(2) PECL
So far as PECL is concerned, comment B to article 3:10118 provides that, although 
the powers of representation conferred upon company directors by statute are not 
covered, if a company grants authority to act on its behalf to an employee other 
than a director, PECL does apply.19 Moreover, it seems that it applies to repre-
sentation of legal persons yet to be incorporated. This is evident from comment 
B to article 3:20720 which uses the example of an agent who acts in the name of a 
company not yet created to illustrate that in such a case the principal is bound as a 
result of ratifi cation as from the moment at which it came into existence. Comment 
B makes it clear that special rules of the applicable company law with respect to 
pre-incorporation contracts take precedence over the terms of PECL.21
(3) PICC
In PICC, comment 5 to article 2.2.122 states that if, under the special rules governing 
the authority of its bodies or offi cers, a corporation is prevented from invoking a 
limitation to its authority against third parties, that corporation may not rely on 
article 2.2.5(1)23 to claim that it is not bound by an act of its bodies or offi cers 
17 See art 4(a) UAC: “an organ, offi cer or partner of a corporation, association, partnership or other entity, 
whether or not possessing legal personality, shall not be regarded as the agent of that entity in so far 
as, in the exercise of his functions as such, he acts by virtue of an authority conferred by law or by the 
constituti ve documents of that entity”. See also Busch, Indirect Representation (n 4) 179 n 20. 
18 “Scope of the Chapter”.  
19 Lando & Beale, Principles of European Contract Law (n 7) 197-198.
20 “Ratifi cation by Principal”.
21 Lando & Beale, Principles of European Contract Law (n 7) 214.
22 “Scope of the Section”.
23 This provides that where an agent acts without authority or exceeds its authority, its acts do not affect 
the legal relations between the principal and the third party.
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that falls outside the scope of their authority. On the other hand (as comment 
5 continues), as long as the general rules laid down in the agency section do not 
confl ict with the special rules on the authority of bodies, offi cers or partners, they 
may be applied in lieu of the latter. Thus, for instance, a third party seeking to 
demonstrate that the contract it has concluded with an offi cer of a corporation 
binds that corporation may invoke either the special rules governing the authority 
of that corporation’s bodies or offi cers, or, as the case may be, the general rules 
on apparent authority laid down in article 2.2.5(2).24 Unlike the Convention and 
PECL, PICC does not address the question of representation of legal persons prior 
to incorporation, but silence may indicate that it applies in such cases, subject to 
the restriction that the applicable company law takes precedence. 
(4) UK company law
The effect of the First Directive on Company Law should be noted here.25 This 
directive is currently implemented in the UK by sections 35, 35A and 35B of the 
Companies Act 1985,26 which protect third parties “dealing with”27 a company in 
good faith from limitations on the power of the representative of the company. 
The defi nition of good faith contained within the UK legislation is complex.  A 
person will be presumed to be acting in good faith,28 and will not be regarded 
as acting in bad faith by reason only that he knows that the act is beyond the 
powers of the directors.29 Reynolds suggests that the word “only” is intended to 
distinguish situations where the directors are exceeding their authority from those 
where they are actually abusing it:30 
In the fi rst situation mere knowledge of this fact will not result in a person dealing with 
the company being unable to enforce his transaction; and this goes further than the 
normal rules of apparent authority. But where he knows or is to be taken to know that 
the directors are abusing their authority, there will be no such protection.
Agents acting on behalf of companies not yet incorporated are subject to 
relatively strict rules which prevent the creation of a contract with an unincor-
24 UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 75-76.
25 First Council Directive 1968/151 OJ 1968 L065/8-12.
26 These sections will be re-enacted with minor amendments by the Companies Act 2006 ss 39, 40 and 41. 
The Government anticipates that these provisions will be in force by October 2008.   
27 For the defi nition of this phrase, see Companies Act 1985 s 35A(2)(a) (Companies Act 2006 s 40(2)).
28 Companies Act 1985 s 35A(2)(c) (Companies Act 2006 s 40(2)(b)(ii)).
29 Companies Act 1985 s 35A(2)(b) (Companies Act 2006 s 40(2)(b)(iii)). A person acts in good faith if he 
acts genuinely and honestly in the circumstances: see Barclays Bank Ltd v TOSG Trust Fund Ltd [1984] 
BCLC 1 at 18 per Nourse J (on the predecessor of s 35).
30 See F M B Reynolds, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, 18th edn (2006) para 8-038.
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porated company.31 Any agent who purports to do so will not bind his principal, 
but will rather be personally bound by the contract. The company, once formed, 
is not bound by such contracts and cannot ratify them. In order to create a legally 
enforceable relationship with the third party, the company would have to enter 
into a new contract.32
D. DIRECT AND INDIRECT AGENCY
Civil Law jurisdictions apply a distinction between direct and indirect agency which 
is not present in Common Law systems. The distinction depends on whether or 
not the agent discloses when he concludes the contract that he is acting in the 
name of the principal. If he does so, this is direct representation, the effect of 
which is the formation of a contract between principal and third party. Where the 
agent acts in his own name – but still on behalf of the principal in the sense that 
the transaction is ultimately at the risk and for the benefi t of the principal – this is 
indirect representation, the effect of which is the formation of a contract between 
agent and third party. In indirect representation, this outcome applies even where 
the third party is aware that the agent is acting on behalf (though not in the name) 
of a principal.
The distinction between direct and indirect agency is not found in either the 
Convention or in PICC. The Convention applies where “one person, the agent, has 
authority or purports to have authority on behalf of another person, the principal, 
to conclude a contract of sale of goods with a third party.”33 Article 1(4) makes 
it clear that the Convention applies irrespective of whether the agent acts in his 
own name or in that of the principal.34 In similar vein, article 2.2.1(1) of PICC 
states that its section on agency “governs the authority of a person (‘the agent’) 
to affect the legal relations of another person (‘the principal’) by or with respect 
to a contract with a third party, whether the agent acts in its own name or in that 
of the principal.”35 By contrast, PECL adopts the traditional Civilian distinction 
between direct and indirect representation, although its presence is somewhat 
misleading.36 Importantly, PECL contains provisions which permit direct actions 
between principal and third party even where the agent acted in his own name.37 
31 Companies Act 1985 s 36C(1) (Companies Act 2006 s 51(1)). This section implements art 7 of the First 
Company Law Directive 1968/151.
32 S Mayson, D French and C Ryan, Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law, 23rd edn (2007) 754. 
33 Art 1(1) UAC. 
34 See Busch, Indirect Representation (n 4) 180-181. 
35 See also UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 75.
36 Art 3:102 PECL. See Lando & Beale, Principles of European Contract Law (n 7) 199-200; Busch, 
Indirect Representation (n 4) 211 ff.
37 Arts 3:301-3:304 PECL.  
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Such actions are wide in scope, and, as a result, the main legal consequence which 
would normally be implied by the use of the term “indirect agency” does not apply 
under PECL.
Although Scots law does not recognise indirect agency as a legal concept, it 
does apply different legal consequences depending upon whether or not the agent 
acts in his own name. While the norm is disclosed agency, the agent may disclose 
only the existence and not the identity of his principal (i.e. acting for an unnamed 
principal). The legal effect is uncertain.38 Alternatively, the agent may act as 
though he were the actual principal, failing to disclose even the fact of agency (i.e. 
acting for an undisclosed principal).39 Although this fi nal possibility may seem to 
resemble indirect agency, the legal effect is the opposite. In Scots law the principal 
and the third party have a largely unqualifi ed right to “intervene” on a contract 
formed in this way in order to make use of all normal contractual remedies.
Indirect representation, although highly important in Civilian systems, does 
not fall within the ambit of this article. Although it is possible to apply the concept 
of apparent authority to certain cases of what may be called “unauthorised indirect 
representation”40 the focus of attention here is on direct rather than indirect repre-
sentation.
Direct representation is defi ned in very similar ways in the three international 
instruments, the defi nitions in the Convention and PICC being almost identical. 
Essentially, it occurs where the agent enters into contracts in the name of the 
principal and possesses the necessary authority to do so.41
E. TYPES OF AUTHORITY
Apparent authority is, of course, only the appearance of authority. To the third 
party, the agent appears to be authorised, even though he is not. As the agent has 
no “real” authority, he cannot, therefore, conclude a contract on the principal’s 
behalf. Nevertheless, apparent authority has a close, and sometimes confusing, 
relationship with the different types of “real” authority which may exist. 
The major types of “real” authority can be identifi ed relatively easily. The 
38 Macgregor (n 3) paras 137-146. In PECL, there is a specifi c rule for this situation in art 3:203 (Uniden-
tifi ed Principal): “If an agent enters into a contract in the name of a principal whose identity is to be 
revealed later, but fails to reveal that identity within a reasonable time after a request by the third party, 
the agent itself is bound by the contract.”
39 Macgregor (n 3) paras 147-164.
40 On “unauthorised indirect representation” and “apparent authority for indirect representation”, see 
Busch, Indirect Representation (n 4) 232 ff, 235 ff respectively.
41 See art 12 UAC (on which see Busch, Indirect Representation (n 4) 181-182, with further references); 
art 2.2.3(1) PICC (on which see UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 78-80; Bonell (n 4) at 387-390); art 3:102(1) 
PECL (on which see Bonell (n 4) at 387; Busch, Indirect Representation (n 4) 211-212).
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agent may have express authority, which is authority expressly granted either in 
a written contract or orally. Alternatively, he may have implied authority, which 
may arise in different ways. It may arise because it is necessary to carry out the 
object of the agency agreement, because it is incidental to it, or because it is 
customary in the particular trade in question. It may be implied in the sense that 
it is usual, meaning that it arises as an implication from the post the agent holds, 
e.g. a solicitor benefi ts from the authority which it would be usual for someone in 
that profession to have.42 As a type of implied authority, usual authority constitutes 
“real” authority: it allows the agent to conclude a contract on his principal’s behalf. 
It will be referred to here as “implied usual authority”.
The term “usual authority” may have two further meanings, the implications of 
which have been considered in English but not in Scots law. 
In order to understand the fi rst such meaning, one must consider the situation 
of an agent who has been appointed to a particular post. One would expect him 
to possess the authority which is usual for those in such a post to have. However, 
one must further imagine that the principal has expressly prohibited the specifi c 
task which the agent has purported to carry out. This express prohibition rules out 
the possibility of any implied usual authority: authority cannot be implied in the 
face of an express prohibition. As a result, the only way in which the third party 
can be protected is through the operation of apparent authority. Such a situation, 
however, poses challenges for apparent authority reasoning. Apparent authority 
rests on a representation by the principal. Here, the representation is very weak, 
consisting of the simple placing of the agent in the particular post. Arguably, this 
makes it more diffi cult for the third party to invoke the concept of apparent author-
ity.43 As is explored later,44 the adoption of what is known as the “risk principle” 
might make it easier for a third party to succeed in the use of apparent authority 
in such cases. But even if the third party succeeds in overcoming this hurdle, it 
should be recalled that usual authority of this type is not “real” authority. The 
agent remains unauthorised and unable to conclude a contract on the principal’s 
behalf. The third party’s remedy lies in the operation of apparent authority as a 
type of personal bar. 
There is little evidence of usage of the term “usual authority” in Scots law, whether 
as implied usual authority or in the apparent authority context just discussed. It is, 
42 Macgregor (n 3) para 50.
43 But see the references to “usual authority” in the judgment of Steyn LJ in First Energy (UK) Ltd v 
Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 at 201, where the concept of a representa-
tion by the principal is stretched to its limits. Cf Pacifi c Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 208 ALR 
213 at 226 (a judgment of the full court), on which see G H L Fridman, “Variations on the theme of 
authority” (2006) 22 Journal of Contract Law 105 at 112 ff. 
44 See G.(1) below. The risk principle places less reliance on a representation by the principal.
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however, important to note the Scottish usage of the terms “general” and “special” 
or “limited” agent.45 A “general” agent is one who is employed to carry out all 
of the business of the principal of a particular type, whereas a “special” agent is 
employed to carry out a single transaction. Only the general agent can benefi t 
from apparent authority.46
The second further meaning of “usual authority” is much less important for the 
purposes of this article and so will only be briefl y noted. It has been suggested 
by Reynolds that “usual authority” is a concept in its own right, independent of 
implied authority and apparent authority.47 The implications of this suggestion are 
not considered here, usual authority being relevant only to the extent necessary to 
understand apparent authority. 
F. APPARENT AUTHORITY
(1) Historical development in Scotland
The Scottish concept of apparent authority is elusive, and one is more likely to 
fi nd use of the classic defi nition from English law, provided by Lord Diplock in 
Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd:48
a legal relationship between the principal and the contractor created by a representa-
tion, made by the principal to the contractor, intended to be and in fact acted on by the 
contractor, that the agent has authority to enter on behalf of the principal into a contract 
of a kind within the scope of the “apparent” authority, so as to render the principal liable 
to perform any obligations imposed on him by such a contract.
For the moment, the actual terms of this defi nition are not the focus of atten-
tion, but rather the use of English rather than Scots authority. This is perhaps 
not surprising given the lack of a detailed treatment in Scots law. The institu-
tional writers provide a wealth of analysis of mandate, the gratuitous relation-
ship which was, in many ways, the source of the principles of the non-gratuitous 
concept of agency. However, apparent authority developed a good deal later than 
the time at which the institutional writers published their works. The principles 
of the common law of agency (as opposed to mandate) are a relatively recent 
development. Stoljar noted that they were not fully formulated until the turn of 
45 Gloag, Contract (n 2) 150; Macgregor (n 3) paras 55-56.
46 Gloag, Contract (n 2) 150.
47 See, in particular, the explanation of the infamous English case of Watteau v Fenwick [1893] 1 QB 346 
in Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 30) para 3-006 (iii); cf Busch, Indirect Representation (n 4) 132, 
135-136.
48 [1964] 2 QB 480 at 503. See most recently Ben Cleuch Estates Ltd v Scottish Enterprise [2006] CSOH 
35, 2006 GWD 8-154 at para 127 per Lord Reed, adopting the opinion of Lord Cullen in Capital Land 
Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment 28 July 1995, Court of Session Outer House. 
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the nineteenth century.49 In relation to apparent authority in particular, Atiyah 
traced a major shift in its legal basis during the nineteenth century.50 According 
to Atiyah, it moved from liability of the principal based on the fact that he is the 
major benefi ciary of the use of agents to liability on the basis of his will, agreement 
or authority. Apparent authority was clearly still in the process of development 
during the nineteenth century.
This is not to say that there are no relevant Scottish authorities during this 
period. There are cases from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in 
which principals were held liable for unauthorised actions of “agents” in situations 
resembling those which would be classed as apparent authority in a modern context. 
Such cases are, however, properly regarded as examples of mandate, involving 
representation of a “paterfamilias” by his wife,51 a family member52 or servants.53 
They have not been cited in modern commercial cases, and this is probably correct. 
All involve very close domestic relationships, so that mandant and mandantar are, 
in effect, merged into a single legal person. It is doubtful whether commercial 
agency is suffi ciently analogous for the precedents to be relevant. Also the reports 
contain very little analysis rendering them of little use as precedents. 
During the nineteenth century there are a number of relevant decisions, 
although the terms “ostensible” and “apparent” authority tend not to be used.54 
Often the case is resolved by reference to the concept of homologation,55 which, 
in this context, can be defi ned as knowledge and acquiescence by the principal of 
a course of conduct by the agent. Homologation was recently identifi ed by Elspeth 
Reid as both a forerunner and a component part of personal bar.56 It was used 
most notably by the Second Division in International Sponge Importers v Watt 
and Sons,57 a case which is explored below and which eventually progressed to the 
49 See Stoljar, Agency (n 1) 3, 14.
50 P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 496 ff.   
51 Gloag contrasts Scots law on this point with English law: see Contract (n 2) 147 n 6, referring to Deben-
ham v Mellon [1880] 6 App Cas 24.  
52 Knox v Hay (1813) Hume 351; Ferguson & Lillie v Stephen (1864) 2 M 804.
53 Oliver v Grieve (1792) Hume 319; Inches v Elder (1793) Hume 322; Dewar v Nairne (1804) Hume 340; 
Mortimer v Hamilton (1868) 7 M 158.
54 Aside from the mandate cases mentioned at nn 52 and 53 above, other notable examples (including 
those from a later period) are The North of Scotland Banking Company v Behn, Möller, & Co (1881) 8 
R 423; Thomas Hayman & Sons v The American Cotton Oil Co (1907) 45 SLR 207; British Bata Shoe 
Co v Double M Shah Ltd 1980 SC 311; Dornier GmbH v Cannon 1991 SC 310; Bank of Scotland v 
Brunswick Developments (1987) Ltd (No 2) 1997 SC 226. Only in the more recent cases is it possible to 
fi nd the terms “apparent authority” and “ostensible authority”.     
55 Swinburne and Company v The Western Bank of Scotland (1856) 18 D 1025; Finlayson v The Braidbar 
Quarry Co (1864) 2 M 1297 at 1303 per Lord Benholme; Colvin v Dixon (1867) 5 M 603 at 609-610 
per Lord Curriehill. See also A C Black, “Principal and Agent”, in Greens Encyclopaedia of the Law of 
Scotland, 2nd edn, vol 9 (1913) 461.
56 E Reid, “Personal bar: case-law in search of principle” (2003) 7 EdinLR 340 at 341.   
57 1911 SC (HL) 57 at 68 per Lord Ardwall, 61 per Lord Low. 
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House of Lords. Unfortunately, the judges in the House of Lords did not share the 
view of the Second Division on the importance of homologation. In more recent 
cases the courts have tended to rely on English precedents and not on Scottish 
ones. In general, Lord Diplock’s locus classicus is used. 
The current state of the law can be illustrated by reference to the approach 
of Lord Rodger in Bank of Scotland v Brunswick Developments (1987) Ltd (No 
2).58 Referring to what was, in that particular case, agreed between the parties, he 
explained that apparent authority is “… in both systems … built on the doctrine 
which is known as estoppel in English law and personal bar in Scots law.”59 At 
this point, almost invariably, legal analysis stops. This may, of course, be due to 
the failure of counsel to cite the relevant cases. If so, this is not because of a lack 
of case law – reference to Rankine’s Personal Bar confi rms that this is certainly 
not so.60 However, Rankine’s work is more a collection of cases than a systematic 
treatment of the same, and Scots lawyers have had to wait until recent times for 
a systematic treatment to appear, in the form of two articles by Elspeth Reid61 
followed by a full-length book by Reid and John Blackie.62 As a result, Scots law 
currently contains little judicial analysis of apparent authority. The task which the 
authors have set themselves in this article therefore takes place at least partially 
in the realms of conjecture. Conclusions are based on specifi c facts in cases which 
are either emphasised by the judiciary or at least used by them to reach their 
conclusions.
(2) Adoption of estoppel by representation?
In the face of this lack of authority, it might be asked why Scots lawyers do not 
simply adopt the principles of English estoppel by representation. Scots lawyers 
should consider their responses to this question carefully, lest motives based on 
national protectionism be permitted to dominate. Plainly, there are advantages in 
the adoption in Scotland of the English rules. Perhaps most importantly, it would 
achieve uniformity of agency principles throughout the UK. The infl uence which 
English agency principles have achieved throughout the Common Law should be 
58 1997 SC 226 at 234.  
59 1997 SC 226 at 234 per Lord President Rodger. It should be noted that, in England, there is much 
argument as to whether or not apparent authority should be regarded as based on estoppel. The main 
diffi culties with the estoppel approach are (i) the representation giving rise to the estoppel is, in this area, 
permitted to be very general, and (ii) the detriment incurred by the representee may be small. Arguably, 
apparent authority has become a doctrine in its own right: see Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 30) 
para 8-029.  
60 J Rankine, A Treatise on the Law of Personal Bar in Scotland (1921).
61 Reid (n 56); E Reid, “Acquiescence in the air: William Grant v Glen Catrine Bonded Ware” 2001 JR 
191 at 193.  
62 E C Reid and J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006). 
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borne in mind here. Practising lawyers might question the benefi t in the develop-
ment of distinctive Scots principles which are somewhat obscure and could lead to 
differences north and south of the border. In essence, the question can be bluntly 
stated as: “Why bother?”
In fact there are sound reasons why Scots law should not be assimilated with 
English law in this area. Now that academic analysis of personal bar is available, 
the differences between the Scottish concept and English estoppel by represen-
tation have become clear. One particularly fundamental difference is the unitary 
nature of personal bar compared with the fragmented structure of estoppels in 
English law. One is reminded of Lord Clarke’s words cautioning against the assim-
ilation of the Scots and English concepts: 63
the former sharp distinction between law and equity in England, and the doctrine 
of consideration in that jurisdiction, have meant that the development of the law of 
estoppel has proceeded, from time to time, on different lines from that of personal bar 
in Scotland. 
This being the case, it is unlikely that estoppel by representation would fi t well 
into the underlying structure of Scots law.  Now would also be a curious time 
to assimilate Scots and English law, when the major harmonisation project in 
contract law, the Common Frame of Reference, emanates from the European 
Union. Why opt for a Common Law solution when the main European initiative 
will, inevitably, be more Civilian in nature? In summary, there seems no pressing 
reason to adopt estoppel by representation, and there are potentially signifi cant 
pitfalls inherent in doing so.
(3) The international instruments
At this point it is helpful to look to the equivalent terms of the international instru-
ments. All three versions, which are relatively similar, are quoted here in full and 
are analysed throughout the remainder of this article.
The UNIDROIT Agency Convention provides in article 14(2) that: 
… where the conduct of the principal causes the third party reasonably and in good 
faith to believe that the agent has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that the 
agent is acting within the scope of that authority, the principal may not invoke against 
the third party the lack of authority of the agent.
Article 3:201(3) of PECL states that:
63 William Grant & Sons Ltd  v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 2001 SC 901 at 944 where Lord 
Clarke approves Lord Keith in Armia v Daejan Developments Ltd 1979 SC (HL) 56 at 72; also Lord 
President Rodger at 915. See further Reid (n 61) at 193.
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… a person is to be treated as having granted authority to an apparent agent if the person’s 
statements or conduct induce the third party reasonably and in good faith to believe that 
the apparent agent has been granted authority for the act performed by it.
Finally, article 2.2.5(2) of PICC states that:
… where the principal causes the third party reasonably to believe that the agent has 
authority to act on behalf of the principal and that the agent is acting within the scope of 
that authority, the principal may not invoke against the third party the lack of authority 
of the agent.
(4) Doctrinal basis
In his discussion of apparent authority, Gloag stated that “any general theory is diffi -
cult to fi nd or apply.”64 The work carried out by Reid and Blackie provides valuable 
assistance in this exercise. They indicate that personal bar “penalises inconsistent 
conduct.”65 A similar legal basis can be found in PICC66 where apparent authority 
is said to be part of the express prohibition against inconsistent behaviour,67 as well 
as an application of the general principle of good faith.68 Less information as to 
doctrinal basis is provided in the explanatory comments to the other instruments, 
but, in view of the similarity in the wording of all three versions, their doctrinal 
basis is unlikely to differ markedly.69
The references to good faith and the prevention of inconsistent behaviour may 
suggest an underlying purpose of protection of the reasonable expectations of 
the third party. It is consistent with this protective aim that, in two of the inter-
national instruments, the third party is entitled to invoke apparent authority but 
not obliged to do so.70 Is it similarly the case under Scots law that the third party 
could refuse to invoke apparent authority? This, again, is a question of personal 
bar, applied this time to the third party’s conduct. Although this anticipates the 
discussion of the requirements of personal bar, below,71 it can be stated that the 
third party is unlikely to be barred from refusal because no element of unfairness 
64 Gloag, Contract (n 2) 147.
65 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) para 2-01.
66 Art 2.2.5(1) PICC; UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 83-84 (comment 2).
67 Art 1.8 PICC states: “A party cannot act inconsistently with an understanding it has caused the other 
party to have and upon which that other party reasonably has acted in reliance to its detriment.”
68 Art 1.7 PICC states “(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in interna-
tional trade. (2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.”  
69 See with respect to the UAC, M J Bonell, “The 1983 Geneva Convention on Agency in the International 
Sale of Goods” (1984) 32 American Journal of Comparative Law 717 at 739-740. 
70 With respect to the UAC, see Bonell (n 69) at 740; H A Stöcker, “Das Genfer Übereinkommen über die 
Vertretung beim internationalen Warenkauf” 1983 Wertpapier-Mitteilungen 778 at 783. With respect to 
art 2.2.5(2) PICC, see F M B Reynolds, “Authority of agents” 2005 ICC International Court of Arbitra-
tion Bulletin, Special Supplement, UNIDROIT Principles: New Developments and Applications 13.  
71 See G. below.
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exists. The third party is the victim, not the party seeking to take unfair advantage 
of the situation.
The position appears to be different under PECL. It is stated there that “a 
person [i.e. the principal] is to be treated as having granted authority.72 Thus, one is 
asked to assume that full authority exists. Where apparent authority operates under 
PECL, a valid contract exists – a fact which none of the three parties can deny. 
The third party is bound by this contract. Scots law, therefore, appears to permit 
conduct by the third party which PECL would not permit. In fact, the result under 
PECL is probably not as unfair to the third party as it might at fi rst appear. He is, 
of course, only being held to the contract which he freely entered into. 
(5) Scope
In discussing the scope of the apparent authority rules in the international instru-
ments, the scope of the instruments as a whole should be borne in mind – for 
example, the limitation of the UNIDROIT Agency Convention to the interna-
tional sale of goods.73 In fact the apparent authority rules extend further than 
might have been anticipated. This is because of the existence of special rules 
which apply where the agent’s (actual) authority is terminated by events such as 
the death, mental incapacity or bankruptcy of the principal. The “appearance” 
of authority which is the essence of apparent authority may continue notwith-
standing the event which has terminated the agent’s authority. All three interna-
tional instruments contain special rules governing these situations. The Conven-
tion and PICC both provide that termination does not affect the third party unless 
he knew or ought to have known of it.74 Furthermore, in both instruments the 
agent remains authorised, notwithstanding termination, to perform on behalf of 
the principal (or, in the Convention, the principal and successors) those acts that 
are necessary to prevent damage to its interests.75 The comments in PICC indicate 
that the same rule applies, with appropriate modifi cations, to subsequent restric-
tions of an agent’s authority.76
The provisions in PECL are similar if more elaborate.77 Article 3:209(1) provides 
that an agent’s authority continues until the third party knows or ought to know 
that (a) the agent’s authority has been brought to an end by the principal, the 
agent, or both; or (b) the acts for which the authority had been granted have been 
completed, or the time for which it had been granted has expired; or (c) the agent 
72 Art 3:201(3) PECL.
73 See the discussion on scope in B. above.
74 Art 19 UAC; art 2.2.10(1) PICC.
75 Art 20 UAC; art 2.2.10(2) PICC. 
76 UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 93 (comment 4 to art 2.2.10).
77 Art 3:209 PECL.
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has become insolvent or, where a natural person, has died or become incapaci-
tated; or (d) the principal has become insolvent. Where the principal has brought 
the authority to an end78 the third party is considered to be aware of this if it has 
been communicated or publicised in the same manner in which the authority was 
originally communicated or publicised.79 Finally, the agent’s authority is continued 
for a reasonable time to allow him to perform those acts which are necessary to 
protect the interests of the principal or its successors.80
The Scottish principles on this same issue of the scope of the agent’s apparent 
authority were formed at an early stage, bearing in mind the relative modernity of 
the law of agency as a whole. They are explored in the works of Stair and Erskine, 
and in one particular case: Pollok v Paterson.81 This valuable case was decided by 
a bench of fi ve judges of the Second Division in 1811. Looking fi rstly at the views 
of Stair and Erskine, in the context of mandate,82 the judges note the general 
rule, that the relationship of mandate terminates on the death of either party,83 
before citing two exceptions. First, the mandatar/agent is entitled to complete 
any partially performed transactions notwithstanding the death of the mandant/
principal. Secondly, an exception “bonae fi dei” exists, which permits the mandatar 
to carry out transactions where he is unaware of the mandant’s death, whether or 
not those transactions have commenced at the time of death.84 The analysis can be 
fl eshed out by reference to Pollok v Paterson itself.85 In this case, which concerned 
the mental incapacity and eventual sequestration of the principal, Lord Meadow-
bank explained why the particular event which terminated the agency relation-
ship did not act to terminate the agent’s authority: “Once given, the mandate 
continues sua natura, and does not require a continuation of mental exertion or 
approbation.”86 He confi rmed that third parties dealing with the mandatary were 
protected, provided that they acted in good faith.87  Roman and Civilian authori-
ties were discussed and clearly had an impact on the outcome.88
78 Art 3:209(1)(a) PECL.
79 Art 3:209(2) PECL. 
80 Art 3:209(3) PECL. Cf Bonell (n 4) at 396 where he criticises the more elaborate approach of PECL on 
the basis that it both admits circumstances as grounds for termination which are not recognised as such 
at a domestic level and excludes others which do operate at a domestic level.
81 10 Dec 1811 FC (369). The case concerned the mental incapacity and eventual sequestration of the 
principal.
82 Stair, Inst 1.12.6; Erskine, Inst 3.3.41.
83 Stair, Inst 1.12.6:  “…for this contract arising from a singular affection or friendship betwixt both, the 
removal of either resolves that tie.”  
84 Erskine and Stair cite J Inst 3.26.10 in support of the exceptions. Erskine also cites D 14.3.17.2-3.   
85 10 Dec 1811 FC (369).  
86 At 376.
87 At 377 . 
88 At 377 per Lord Meadowbank, 382 per Lord Justice Clerk Boyle. Both indicate that they are relying on 
Roman sources but without identifying them. They are probably referring to the same passage of the 
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Cases post-dating the works of the institutional writers support the proposition 
that the agent’s authority continues in situations of mental incapacity89 or death.90 
Bankruptcy may, however, be a special case. Although the judgments in Pollok v 
Paterson suggest that the agent’s authority may be continued beyond bankruptcy 
of the principal, this rule is probably superseded by modern bankruptcy legisla-
tion, for it seems unlikely that the agent’s authority survives in the face of the 
vesting of the insolvent party’s goods in the trustee in bankruptcy. The position 
under PECL is different: the agent remains authorised until the third party knows 
or ought to know that the principal is insolvent.91 
Finally, it should be noted that, in Scots law, notifi cation of the cessation of the 
agent’s authority must be direct where a course of dealing exists, but can be by 
advertisement where no such course exists.92 
This discussion of termination of the agent’s authority reveals close similarities 
between Scots law and the international codes. This may not be surprising given 
that there has been little, if any, English infl uence on Scots law in this area.
(6) Effect
The nature of apparent authority as an application of personal bar has an impor-
tant impact on its effect. As already noted, apparent authority bars or prevents 
the principal from pleading the agent’s lack of authority in any issue with the third 
party. Being in essence procedural in nature, it is unlikely to have any stronger, 
“constitutive” effect which would allow it to create a contract where none other-
wise existed.93 This issue can be important. Logically, if no contract exists, specifi c 
implement cannot be competent. The authors have, however, been unable to fi nd 
judicial confi rmation of this point. The position in English law seems similarly 
unclear. Certainly, in English law, the principal has no right to sue the third 
party without fi rst ratifying the agent’s actings, and this would tend to support 
the conclusion that no contract exists.94 However, Powell suggests that the law 
Digest relied on by Erskine (D 14.3.17.2-3).  Counsel for the pursuer cited the discussion of this passage 
by both Pothier and Voet. See R J Pothier, Treatise on the Law of Obligations (transl W D Evans, 1806) 
para 448; J Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (1707) 14.3.3; 17.1. 15.             
89 Pollok v Paterson 10 Dec 1811 FC (369); Wink v Mortimer (1849) 11 D 995.
90 Campbell v Anderson (1829) 3 W & S 384. In a short speech in the House of Lords, Lord Lyndhurst LC 
(at 389) described the case as a “…question of bona fi des.” 
91 Art 3:209(1)(d) PECL.  
92 See, generally, Macgregor (n 3) para 81.
93 See Rankine, Personal Bar (n 60) 1, where he describes the doctrine as a “parcel of the law of evidence”. 
There is a similar statement in G Spencer Bower, The Law relating to Estoppel by Representation, 
4th edn, by P Feltham, D Hochberg and T Leech (2004) V.6.1. Reid (n 56) at 345 also notes that it 
“suppresses rights rather than creates them”.
94 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 30) para 8-031. But raising an action of specifi c performance would 
probably amount to implied ratifi cation by the principal: see Bonell (n 4) at 387.
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“presumes” a contract,95 and Fridman, and perhaps Reynolds also, agree.96 The 
moves towards the harmonisation of contract law at a European level also raise the 
profi le of the remedy of specifi c implement, given its central role in continental 
Civilian systems.97 Thus it remains important to assess whether it is available to 
the third party in Scots law.
The uncertainty on this point renders the terms of the international instru-
ments of particular interest. Apparent authority emerges as the exception to the 
normal rule that an agent acting beyond the confi nes of his authority fails to create 
a binding contract between principal and third party.98 Where apparent authority 
operates in PECL, the principal “is to be treated as having granted authority”,99 
thus deeming the principal to have granted full authority to the agent. This 
approach can be contrasted with PICC and the UNIDROIT Agency Convention 
where the equivalent provisions are phrased in the same way as an estoppel or bar: 
“the principal may not invoke against the third party the lack of authority of the 
agent.”100 Thus, only under PECL may both principal and third party sue in the 
case of apparent authority. This high level of protection is benefi cial, not only to 
the third party, but also to so-called “‘fourth parties” – those acquiring rights, both 
real and personal, from third parties. 
PECL’s solution seems preferable.101 Both principal and third party ought to 
have rights of enforcement of the “contract” created through the use of apparent 
authority. Having been misled as to the realities of the situation, the third party 
certainly ought to have such rights. The principal may be able to avoid the 
question altogether, for it will probably be easier to ratify rather than to enforce 
the contract. This being the case, it is only a small step to grant him a right of 
enforcement. Although this is the ideal solution, the conceptual diffi culties cannot 
be ignored. It is diffi cult to explain how an agent lacking authority may conclude 
a contract. Through the use of its “deeming” provision PECL has simply avoided 
the question.
The protection of fourth parties was mentioned briefl y above. Similar protec-
tions exist in UK law, at least in the context of sale of goods, applying to bona 
95 R Powell, Law of Agency, 2nd edn (1961) 70.
96 G H L Fridman, The Law of Agency, 7th edn (1996) 121; Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 30) para 
8-031 (referring to “a contract”). See also Spencer Bower, Estoppel by Representation (n 93) V.6.1.    
97 See H Beale, A Hartkamp, H Kötz and D Tallon, Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (2001) 
para 6.2.
98 Art 14(1) UAC; art 3:204(1) PECL; art 2.2.5(1) PICC.  
99 Art 3:201(3) PECL.
100 Art 14(2) UAC; art 2.2.5(2) PICC.
101 Cf UNIDROIT 1999, Study L – Doc. 63/Add.1 (http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/
proceedings/1999/study/50/s-50-63add1-e.pdf), containing the comments of Deborah DeMott, who 
(together with Francis Reynolds) acted as external expert in relation to the agency section in PICC: 
“Why should T be able to hold P but P not be able to hold T?” 
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fi de third parties who purchase from mercantile agents acting for buyers or from 
sellers in possession of goods without title to the same,102 or from mercantile 
agents generally.103  Such protections are more limited in nature than the position 
under PECL explored immediately above.   
G. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR APPARENT AUTHORITY
(1) The principal’s conduct and the risk principle
Like the three international instruments, Scots law has – at least formally – adopted 
the classical “of the principal’s own doing” idea104 by which apparent authority 
must be traced back to an act or omission of the principal.105 However, as in Dutch 
law, it is possible to move beyond the principal’s conduct as the sole touchstone 
of liability. Other relevant factors might include the position occupied by the 
apparent agent in an organisation’s hierarchy, or the non-transparent structure of 
a company, or the type of transaction involved. While it is diffi cult to describe such 
factors as “conduct” of the principal, there is a feeling that they ought to come 
within the ambit of the risks which the principal bears. Taking into account such 
factors has been described as adoption of the “risk principle”, in the sense that 
they are matters which lie within the principal’s sphere of risk.
(a) Scots law
In common with other forms of estoppel-based reasoning, Reid and Blackie’s 
analysis rests on the conduct of the principal. Their framework begins with the 
identifi cation of a pre-existing right: “A person claims to have a right, the exercise 
of which the obligant alleges is barred.”106 Thus for present purposes the principal 
(referred to as the “rightholder” in Reid and Blackie’s scheme) may be barred 
from asserting against the third party (the obligant) the “right” to plead the agent’s 
lack of authority in an action raised by the third party. Reid and Blackie then 
proceed to analyse the principal’s conduct. Whereas Common Law systems use 
“representation” for this purpose,107 Reid and Blackie use “inconsistency”. This 
they break down into four parts.108
102 Sale of Goods Act 1979 ss 24, 25.
103 Factors (Scotland) Act 1890 s 1, applying the Factors Act 1889 to Scotland.  
104 The authors apologise for this cumbersome expression, translated from the Dutch word toedoenbe-
ginsel. “Conduct” fails to encompass inaction and is therefore not appropriate.      
105 The central role of the principal’s conduct is illustrated by cases such as British Bata Shoe Co v Double 
M Shah Ltd 1980 SC 311 and Dornier GmbH v Cannon 1991 SC 310.
106 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) paras 2-04–2-06.
107 See, for example, English or South African law, but notably not the American Law Institute, Restate-
ment (Third) of Agency (2006) §1.03, which uses a wider notion of “manifestation”.     
108 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) paras 2-04–2-39. 
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The fi rst requirement is that: “To the obligant’s knowledge, the rightholder 
has behaved in a way which was inconsistent with the exercise of the right.”109 
Applied to apparent authority, this means that the principal, to the third party’s 
knowledge, has behaved in a way which is inconsistent with the exercise of his 
right to plead the agent’s lack of authority in an action raised by the third party. 
Reid and Blackie confi rm that silence may amount to “behaviour”,110 and this 
is consistent with the case law on apparent authority.111 The standard text-book 
examples of apparent authority do indeed involve inaction, for example where 
the principal has limited or withdrawn the agent’s authority but has failed to 
notify business associates.112
The second requirement is that: “At the time of so behaving, the rightholder 
knew about the right.”113 This means that the principal must be aware of the agent’s 
lack of authority at the time when the principal’s “behaviour” took place.  
The third requirement is that: “Nonetheless the rightholder now seeks to 
exercise the right.”114 The principal attempts, in the context of an action raised by 
the third party, to plead the agent’s lack of authority. 
Finally, the fourth requirement is that: “Its exercise will affect the obligant.”115 
To permit the principal to assert the agent’s lack of authority would be to deny the 
third party his normal remedies for breach of contract.
Reid and Blackie’s framework for personal bar can readily be applied to 
apparent authority. A different question is whether there is evidence in the 
Scottish case law of a movement beyond personal bar alone and towards adoption 
of the risk principle. Certainly the importance of the principal’s conduct is usually 
emphasised,116 but International Sponge Importers v Watt and Sons,117 a decision 
of the House of Lords, may provide limited support for going further. The facts 
involved a travelling agent who sold sponges on behalf of the principal. Payment 
109 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) paras 2-07–2-27.  
110 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) para 2-22.
111 See Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 at 503 per 
Diplock LJ, approved by Lord President Hope in Dornier GmbH v Cannon 1991 SC 310 at 314, and 
by Lord Macfadyen in John Davidson (Pipes) Ltd v First Engineering Ltd 2001 SCLR 73 at 78.      
112 See W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 11th edn, by L J Dunlop et al (2001) paras 
21.28-21.29; F Davidson and L Macgregor, Commercial Law in Scotland (2003) 58. See also Gloag, 
Contract (n 2) 147 (citing Bell, Prin § 288); The North of Scotland Banking Company v Behn, Möller, 
& Co (1881) 8 R 423. The Partnership Act 1890 s 36 is, in effect, this principle in statutory form.   
113 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) paras 2-28–2-37.
114 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) para 2-38.
115 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) para 2-39.
116 British Bata Shoe Co v Double M Shah Ltd 1980 SC 311 at 316-318 per Lord Jauncey; Thomas 
Hayman & Sons v The American Cotton Oil Co (1907) 45 SLR 207 at 212 per Lord Justice Clerk 
Macdonald; Dornier GmbH v Cannon 1991 SC 310 at 314 per Lord President Hope; Bank of Scotland 
v Brunswick Developments (1987) Ltd (No 2) 1997 SC 226 at 234 per Lord President Rodger.
117 International Sponge Importers v Watt and Sons 1911 SC (HL) 57.
ELR11_3_03_Busch.indd   368 23/8/07   09:09:47
369apparent authority in scots lawVol 11 2007
for goods was made by cheque in the name of the principal, sent directly by the 
customer to the principal. The agent began to accept payment either by cheque 
made out in his own name or in cash, and eventually absconded with the princi-
pal’s funds. It was held that the principal could not recover such sums from the 
customer, having failed to object to the new method of payment used by the agent. 
Thus far, International Sponge Importers seems to be a classic case of apparent 
authority where the principal has acquiesced in a new course of dealing. However, 
evidence of the principal’s acquiescence was extremely weak. In fact, he may only 
have been aware of one incidence of unauthorised behaviour, and even that was 
doubtful. Yet although the role of the principal’s conduct was minor, it seems 
unlikely that the case can be used as evidence of adoption of the risk principle. 
Legal analysis in the House of Lords was scant, and the case has subsequently 
been described as a decision “on its own facts”.118 It is typical of agency cases of 
the period in which the judiciary selects the party on whom, in their opinion, the 
loss ought to fall, but without fully explaining why.119
(b) International instruments
In international instruments, the “of the principal’s own doing” idea is refl ected 
in different ways: under the Convention apparent authority applies where the 
conduct of the principal “causes” the third party’s belief,120 under PECL where 
the principal’s “statements or conduct induce” the third party’s belief,121 and 
under PICC where the principal “causes” the third party’s belief.122 However, the 
comments to PICC provide that both the position occupied by the apparent agent 
in the organisation’s hierarchy and also the type of transaction involved can consti-
tute apparent authority.123 This is confi rmed by examples given in the comments, 
the fi rst of which is as follows:124
A, a manager of one of company B’s branch offi ces, though lacking actual authority to 
do so, engages construction company C to redecorate the branch’s premises. In view of 
the fact that a branch manager normally would have the authority to enter into such a 
contract, B is bound by the contract with C since it was reasonable for C to believe that 
A had actual authority to enter into the contract.
118 British Bata Shoe Co v Double M Shah Ltd 1980 SC 311 at 317 per Lord Jauncey.
119 See Mortimer v Hamilton (1868) 7 M 158 at 161 per Lord Deas; J M & J H Robertson v Beatson, 
M’Leod & Co Ltd 1908 SC 921 at 923 per the Lord Ordinary (Lord Johnston). This tendency is also 
noted in Gloag, Contract (n 2) 147.     
120 Art 14(2) UAC.
121 Art 3:201(3) PECL.
122 Art 2.2.5(2) PICC.
123 UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 83-84 (comment 2 to art 2.2.5).
124 UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 84 (comment 2 to art 2.2.5).
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PECL too may depart from the principal’s conduct as the sole basis of apparent 
authority. The following example is found in the comments:125
A jeweller’s shop has instructed its employee not to accept personal cheques from a 
customer. The employee disregards the instruction. The jeweller is bound by virtue of 
the employee’s apparent authority to accept cheques since payment by personal cheque 
in jewellers’ shops is general practice.
It is worth stating that, although the examples may look like instances of implied 
usual authority, they are clearly not intended to be so, both being located in the 
sections on apparent authority. In using these examples, it seems clear that the 
drafters of PECL and PICC intended to extend apparent authority by adopting 
the risk principle. However, it is unfortunate that confi rmation of this point exists 
in the comments only and not in the actual rules. As a result, this can provide only 
weak evidence of its adoption.
(c) English law
Like Scots law, English law has not adopted the risk principle.126 However, it has 
begun to depart from the principal’s conduct as the sole factor leading to liability. 
Reynolds has identifi ed a move away from estoppel-type reasoning towards a 
concept which is based on “the objective analysis applicable to the formation 
of contracts”.127 Lord Steyn has taken several opportunities to explore a similar 
theme, both in judgments128 and in articles,129 – most famously in the opening lines 
of his judgment in First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd:130 
“A theme that runs through our law of contract is that the reasonable expectations 
of honest men must be protected.”
This approach is quite different from the risk principle. By applying an objec-
tive analysis to contract formation, it protects the reasonable expectations of the 
third party, whether they arise as a result of the principal’s conduct or because of 
other factors. Its fl aw is that, followed to a logical conclusion, it dictates that both 
principal and third party are bound by the contract. As is illustrated above, this is 
clearly not the case in either English or Scots law where only the principal (and not 
125 Lando & Beale, Principles of European Contract Law (n 7) 203 (comment D to art 3:201).
126 The importance of the principal’s conduct is affi rmed in Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA [1986] AC 717.
127 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 30) para 8-029, ultimately concluding that the estoppel justifi ca-
tion should be retained.  For strong support for a broader rationale see I Brown, “The agent’s apparent 
authority: paradigm or paradox?” (1995) JBL 360  
128 Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 3 All ER 895 at 903-904.  
129 J Steyn, “Contract law: fulfi lling the reasonable expectations of honest men” (1997) 113 LQR 433; J 
Steyn, “Written contracts: to what extent may evidence control language?” (1988) 41 Current Legal 
Problems 23.
130 [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 at 196. See also 204.
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the third party) is “bound” in the sense of being barred from pleading the agent’s 
lack of authority. But while this approach cannot, therefore, provide an entirely 
satisfactory solution, it is indicative of a growing feeling that the principal ought 
to be liable in more situations than is currently the case under the estoppel-based 
regime.
(d) Dutch law
As already mentioned, Dutch law appears to have adopted the risk principle. Admit-
tedly, the provision on apparent authority in the Civil Code stipulates that a reason-
able belief by the third party of the existence of authority must have been created 
by the principal himself, i.e. by means of his declaration or conduct.131 However, 
since 1970 this so-called “of the principal’s own doing” idea has been criticised 
by various writers, starting with Schoordijk, who was – interestingly enough – 
inspired by the Anglo-American doctrine of apparent authority.132 Although there 
are differences of detail, these writers advocate replacing or supplementing the 
“of the principal’s own doing” idea by the risk principle.133 Equally, it is possible 
to identify a trend in the decisions of the Dutch Supreme Court134 towards more 
emphasis on who should bear the risk for giving the impression of power of repre-
sentation, and less emphasis on the “of the principal’s own doing” idea, particularly 
in cases where the principal is a legal person.135
The landmark case in this respect is Felix v Aruba.136 Mr Felix entered into 
negotiations with the airport manager of the international airport in Aruba 
regarding the transport of crew and passengers of light aircraft. In anticipation 
of a formal licence, Felix handled arrangements for light aircraft between March 
and December 1986. However, in November 1986 the Minister of Transport and 
Communication decided that, in future, the transport of crew and passengers 
131 Art 3:61(2) Dutch Civil Code.
132 H C F Schoordijk, “Het leerstuk van de opgewekte schijn van volmacht en de Engels-Amerikaan-
srechtelijke leer van de ‘apparent authority’”, in Honderd jaar rechtsleven. De Nederlandse Juristen-
Vereniging 1870-1970 (1970) 1, reprinted in J M van Dunné, J H Nieuwenhuis, J B M Vranken (eds), 
Verspreid werk van prof mr H C F Schoordijk (1991) 197.
133 S C J J Kortmann, Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht, 
Vertegenwoordiging en rechtspersoon, De vertegenwoordiging, 8th edn (2004) nos 38-43, with further 
references. 
134 Hoge Raad (henceforth HR).
135 HR 4 June 1976, 1977 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (henceforth NJ) 336 (Liberty II); HR 27 Jan 1984, 
1984 NJ 545 (WGO v Koma); HR 24 April 1992, 1993 NJ 190 (Kuyt v MEAS); HR 27 Nov 1992, 1993 
NJ 287 (Felix v Aruba); HR 19 Nov 1993, 1994 NJ 622 (COVA); HR 9 Oct 1998, 1999 NJ 581(Hartman 
v Bakker); HR 23 Oct 1998, 1999 NJ 582 (Nacap v Kurstjens). But see HR 24 Dec 1993, 1994 NJ 303 
(Credit Lyonnais Bank v T); HR 12 Jan 2001, 2001 NJ 157 (Kuijpers v Wijnveen) which stipulated the 
requirement that it should be the “doing” of the principal. 
136 HR 27 Nov 1992, 1993 NJ 287.
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would be conducted exclusively by Air Aruba NV, and Felix was forced to close 
his business. Felix fi led a claim both for reliance expenses and for expectation 
damages (loss of profi t). He argued that he had dealt with light aircraft from March 
1986 onwards at the request of the Aruban government. During negotiations the 
airport manager had led him to believe that he would be able to continue to do 
so. The government therefore was in breach of contract. In reply, the government 
argued that the airport manager was not authorised to bind it. The Supreme Court 
held that, in the case of negotiations between a government functionary and a 
third party who incorrectly assumes that the functionary is authorised to bind 
the government, such an incorrect assumption might sometimes be the govern-
ment’s responsibility. This would occur where an authorised body led the third 
party to believe that the functionary was authorised to bind the government, but 
other factors might tend towards the same result, such as (i) the position of the 
functionary within the government organisation and his declarations or conduct 
(ii) the circumstance that the organisation or division of authorities is non-trans-
parent for third parties due to lack of clarity, complexity or inaccessibility of the 
relevant regulations, and (iii) an omission on the side of the government to warn 
the third party that the functionary is unauthorised. 
Felix v Aruba shows that not only the declarations or conduct of the principal 
are relevant for the purposes of apparent authority137 but also other circum-
stances lying within his sphere of risk, such as the non-transparent structure of the 
company and the position of the agent within the organisation. The case involved 
unauthorised representation of a government authority, but there seems to be no 
good reason why the reasoning should not also apply to unauthorised representa-
tion of private legal persons.138
In any event, in Hartman v Bakker,139 a case involving unauthorised representa-
tion of a private legal person, it was accepted that the function of a representative 
within the organisation of the principal can lead to an appearance of authority 
which may be successfully invoked by the third party where the representative 
concludes a contract in the principal’s name which appears to be in line with his 
appointment.140 In yet another case, Kuyt v MEAS,141 it was stated that a person 
to whom a bailiff offers a settlement may, in general, assume that the bailiff has 
137 Including inaction where the principal had a duty to act. That inaction on the part of the principal can 
lead to apparent authority is not new: see e.g. HR 1 March 1968, 1968 NJ 246 (Molukse Evangelische 
Kerk v Clijnk).
138 Cf P van Schilfgaarde in his annotation no 2 to HR 27 Nov 1992, 1993 NJ 287 (Felix v Aruba).
139 HR 9 Oct 1998, 1999 NJ 581.
140 See A L H Ernes, “Schijn van volmacht op grond van functie?” (1999) 6346 Weekblad voor Privaat-
recht, Notariaat en Registratie 143.
141 HR 24 April 1992, 1993 NJ 190.
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 suffi cient authority to do so. Not surprisingly, some writers have favoured an 
explanation of these cases based on usual authority.142
(e) The risk principle: for and against
In favour of the risk principle, it can be said that it avoids the strained expansion of 
the “of the principal’s own doing” idea which is currently taking place. More and 
more factors are being classed, unconvincingly, as “conduct” of the principal.143 
By expanding liability beyond “conduct”, the risk principle allows the courts to 
focus on issues lying within the principal’s responsibility. To this extent it is a less 
artifi cial method of imposing liability. It makes explicit factors which were already 
implicit in apparent authority reasoning, and provides those factors with a clearer 
legal basis. As a more nuanced approach, it enables the courts to reach solutions 
which can be tailor-made to the case. In this way the courts can redress a balance 
which, at the moment, is weighted towards protection of principal rather than 
third party.
Against the risk principle is the possibility of a large, and perhaps unmanage-
able, increase in the principal’s liability. Whether this is likely to occur is diffi cult 
to say. It may be that the end result would not be markedly different from the 
current approach, in which the “of the principal’s own doing” idea is artifi cially 
extended. Like any discretionary concept, its success depends on the manner in 
which it is applied by the courts. It is unlikely that the discretion could be limited 
by specifying all potentially relevant issues: the courts would be asked to apply a 
relatively open discretion, guided by factors highlighted as signifi cant in existing 
case law. Certainly the Dutch experience suggests that the discretion is workable. 
It may even act as an incentive for the principal to ensure that his agents act within 
the confi nes of their authority in the future.
It is unlikely that the Scottish courts are in a position to take the leap which 
would be involved in the adoption of the risk principle. For the moment that 
principle should probably remain within the realms of academic debate. Its 
presence in the explanatory notes of PECL and PICC will at least ensure that it 
remains on the wider European agenda. 
142 See S C J J Kortmann, Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 
(n 133) nos 36, 39, 48; E Tjong Tjin Tai, “Driemaal schijnvolmacht” 2001 Nieuwsbrief BW 70; A L 
H Ernes, “Aanstellingsvolmacht, schijn van volmachtverlening en ‘usual authority’” 2004 Nederlands 
Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 167.
143 See e.g. First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 at 201 per 
Steyn LJ; Pacifi c Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas (2004) 208 ALR 213 at 226 (a decision of the full court). 
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(2) The third party’s reasonable belief as to the agent’s authority
Whether or not supplemented by the risk principle, the “of the principal’s own 
doing” idea is only the fi rst step in an apparent authority action. The conduct of 
the third party must also be analysed. As part of this exercise, Reid and Black-
ie’s framework utilises “indicators of unfairness”, not all of which are relevant 
in each case.144 Two of particular relevance in the present context are (i) “the 
obligant reasonably believed that the right would not be exercised”145 and (ii) “as 
a result of that belief the obligant acted, or omitted to act, in a way which was 
proportionate.”146 Applied to an apparent authority case, they become: the third 
party reasonably believed that the principal would not deny the agent’s authority, 
and this reasonable belief caused the third party to act or to omit to act, on the 
basis that the agent’s authority would not be denied. Admittedly, it is more usual, 
in apparent authority cases, to identify the third party’s belief in the extent of the 
agent’s authority, whereas the personal bar framework directs attention to the belief 
that the principal would not deny that authority.  However, this is a difference of 
emphasis only: the same issue looked at from a negative as opposed to a positive 
angle. This difference also seems minor when one considers the emphasis Reid 
and Blackie place on the context-specifi c nature of personal bar.147 The indicators 
may require to be adjusted to accommodate specifi c factual scenarios.
The apparent authority cases in Scotland certainly suggest that the third party’s 
belief must be reasonable. More specifi cally, the cases indicate that the circum-
stances of a transaction may be so unusual as to give rise to a duty of inquiry on the 
part of the third party.148 If so, failure to inquire will negative apparent authority. 
This has recently been affi rmed in several cases149 including one before the First 
Division.150 It is also clear that the further a transaction strays from the normal 
course of business, the more likely it is that the courts will fi nd that apparent 
authority was not present.151 Thus, where an agent offered a price to a third party 
which was below market value, indicating that he was “hard up” and “badly wanting 
144 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) para 2-40.
145 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) paras 2-47–2-50.
146 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) paras 2-51–2-54.
147 See Reid (n 56) at 365-366.
148 City of Glasgow Bank v Moore (1881) 19 SLR 86 at 93 per Lord President Inglis; Paterson Bros v 
Gladstone (1891) 18 R 403 at 406 per Lord President Inglis; Thomas Hayman & Sons  v The American 
Cotton Oil Co (1907) 45 SLR 207; Gloag, Contract (n 2) 151-152. 
149 British Bata Shoe Co Ltd  v Double M Shah Ltd 1980 SC 311 at 318 per Lord Jauncey, relying on 
Scottish authority cited by Gloag, Contract (n 2) 151-2 and on F M B Reynolds and B J Davenport, 
Bowstead on Agency, 14th edn (1976) 253-254.
150 Dornier GmbH v Cannon 1991 SC 310 at 315 per Lord President Hope. 
151 See, for example, Colvin v Dixon (1867) 5 M 603; Hamilton v Dixon (1873) 1 R 72; Walker v Smith 
(1906) 8 F 619; Dornier GmbH v Cannon 1991 SC 310 at 315 per Lord President Hope.   
ELR11_3_03_Busch.indd   374 23/8/07   09:09:47
375apparent authority in scots lawVol 11 2007
money”, it was found, unsurprisingly, that there was no apparent authority.152 The 
result was the same where a third party was asked to send cheques to an employee 
of the principal with the name of the payee left blank, and the cheques were 
returned after payment with the employee entered as payee.153
A similar emphasis on the reasonableness of the third party’s belief can be 
found in the international instruments. The comments to PECL say that state-
ments or conduct by the principal “must have induced a reasonable and good faith 
belief in the third party”.154 Less helpfully, the comments to PICC indicate that 
this question depends on the circumstances of the case.155
In this area, therefore, there appear to be few substantive differences between 
Scots law and the terms of the international instruments. In particular, neither the 
presence in the instruments of a duty of good faith nor the relatively undeveloped 
state of the duty in Scots law has proved signifi cant. The same factual circum-
stances which have motivated the Scots judiciary would undoubtedly also be 
relevant under the international instruments. 
(3) Causation
In Scots law the third party must actually have believed in the existence of authority, 
and a causal nexus must exist between the principal’s conduct and that belief. This 
is illustrated in cases where an absence of actual belief proves fatal to a plea of 
apparent authority.156 Although all three international instruments adopt a similar 
approach,157 PICC and the Convention may be more limited than PECL. Both use 
“cause” (and not “permit”, as PECL do) when referring to the principal’s conduct. 
Reynolds has suggested that the word “cause” may denote active and not passive 
conduct (he prefers the use of “permit”).158 The issue has not been addressed at a 
similar level of detail in Scots law.
(4) Detriment 
In Scots law, the fourth indicator within Reid and Blackie’s framework is relevant 
to the issue of the extent of loss or detriment that the third party must suffer. It 
152 Thomas Hayman & Sons v The American Cotton Oil Co (1907) 45 SLR 207.
153 British Bata Shoe Ltd v Double M Shah Ltd 1980 SC 311.
154 Lando & Beale, Principles of European Contract Law (n 7) 203 (comment D to art 3:201).
155 UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 83-84 (comment 2 to art 2.2.5).
156 Smith v North British Railway Co (1850) 12 D 795; The North of Scotland Banking Company  v Behn, 
Möller & Co (1881) 8 R 423; City of Glasgow Bank v Moore (1881) 19 SLR 86; Main & Co v Young 
(1907) 23 Sh Ct Rep 295. See also Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) paras 2-51–2-54.
157 See Lando & Beale, Principles of European Contract Law (n 7) 203 (comment D to art 3:201); art 
14(2) UAC; art 2.2.5(2) PICC.
158 Reynolds (n 70) at 15.
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stipulates that “the exercise of the right would cause prejudice to the obligant 
which would not have occurred but for the inconsistent conduct.”159 Thus, were 
the principal to deny the agent’s authority, prejudice would be caused to the third 
party which would not have occurred but for the principal’s inconsistent conduct. 
Although the concept of “prejudice” is clearly important, according to Reid it 
can be easily established: “Prejudice is almost always present, or B [the obligant] 
would not trouble to oppose A [the rightholder].”160 Prejudice in itself is, however, 
insuffi cient. A further causal nexus must be present, linking the principal’s incon-
sistent conduct with the prejudice which would be suffered if the principal were 
permitted to act in this way.161 To explain the type of prejudice required, Reid 
quotes an infl uential statement from Dixon J in Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold 
Mines Ltd:162 “the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protec-
tion is that which would fl ow from the change of position if the assumption were 
deserted that led to it.”
The prejudice in an apparent authority case is clear. Expecting to be bound to 
the principal by a valid contract, the third party fi nds that the principal denies its 
existence. The causal nexus also exists: this prejudice would not have occurred but 
for the principal’s inconsistent conduct. 
The international instruments omit any reference to prejudice or equivalent. 
This seems surprising in the cases of PICC and the Convention, given their use of 
a traditional form of Common Law estoppel by representation. Change of position 
on the part of the third party is a requirement of that concept.163 In the case of 
PICC the omission is the more surprising because, according to the explanatory 
comments,164 the doctrine of apparent authority is an application not only of the 
general principle of good faith165 but also of the prohibition of inconsistent behav-
iour.166 In PICC the general provision in article 1.8 requires detrimental reliance, 
whereas article 2.2.5(2), which deals only with apparent authority, does not. The 
omission of detrimental reliance in PECL is not at all surprising, the formulation 
of apparent authority which appears there not being estoppel-based.
Should Scots law drop the loss component from its defi nition of apparent 
authority, in the light of its omission from the international instruments? After 
159 Reid & Blackie, Personal Bar (n 62) paras 2-55–2-59.
160 Reid (n 56) at 359.
161 Reid (n 56) at 359.
162 (1937) 59 CLR 641 at 674, cited with approval by Lord Rodger in William Grant v Glen Catrine Bonded 
Warehouse 2001 SC 901 at 921. See also Spencer Bower, Estoppel by Representation (n 93) V.5.9.  
163 Spencer Bower, Estoppel by Representation (n 93) V.5.1-V.5.6.   
164 UNIDROIT Principles (n 9) 83 (comment 2 to art 2.2.5).
165 Art 1.7 PICC.
166 Art 1.8 PICC. 
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all, according to Reid prejudice is “almost always present.”167 One is tempted to 
advocate the removal of such an empty requirement. Third parties seem unlikely 
to raise claims where they have suffered no, or only minimal, loss.
Having chosen not to stipulate prejudice or loss, the international instruments 
need not specify the measure of damages. Given the nature of the third party’s 
loss as the loss of an expected contract, damages ought to be calculated using the 
normal expectation measure rather than the reliance measure – although bearing 
in mind that, in theory, a contract does not exist.
H. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to shed light on the principles of apparent authority in 
Scots law. One of the aims has been to identify the relevant Scottish case law 
so that it can be used in future cases in preference to the broad statements of 
apparent authority found in English case law. As has been more fully argued 
above, there are many reasons why this would be a welcome development, not 
least because now is not the time to assimilate with English law, when harmonisa-
tion at a European level is likely.
This comparison has disclosed few major differences between Scots law and 
the terms of the international instruments. Crucially, like Scots law, PICC and the 
Convention adopt an estoppel- or bar-based concept, and it is only PECL, through 
the use of a deeming provision, which allows the unauthorised agent to create a 
valid contract. PECL’s approach leads to signifi cant benefi ts in the form of simpli-
fi ed remedies, but conceptual diffi culties remain. Scots law could not move in a 
similar direction without dropping the basis of personal bar.
The absence from Scots law of a fully developed duty of good faith has not 
proved of signifi cance. The content of apparent authority is remarkably similar 
to that contained in the international instruments. Only one difference has been 
identifi ed, namely, that in Scotland the third party can opt not to recognise apparent 
authority whereas the third party under PECL seems unable to do so.
Finally, the terms of the international instruments cast doubt on the role of loss 
in the concept of apparent authority. It is, of course, required, but the instruments 
appear to take the view that it is so obvious that it may go unsaid. There must be 
an argument that the same should be true in Scotland.
For the future, attention should be given to the development of the risk 
principle. It is clear that there is dissatisfaction with the limitations of an estoppel- 
or bar-based system. Too often, it tends to favour the principal at the third party’s 
expense. Adoption of the risk principle would increase third party protection, and 
167 Reid (n 56) at 359.
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the experience of Dutch law suggests that it can be adopted without signifi cant 
problems. In view of the very weak support which it currently commands from the 
terms of the international instruments, the best course in Scotland is probably to 
wait and see. The focus of attention should be preparation for further harmonisa-
tion of agency law at European level, whatever form this may take.
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